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Abstract
The prevailing view is that participation in biomedical research is above and beyond the call of duty.
While some commentators have offered reasons against this, we propose a novel public goods
argument for an obligation to participate in biomedical research. Biomedical knowledge is a public
good, available to any individual even if that individual does not contribute to it. Participation in
research is a critical way to support that important public good. Consequently, we all have a duty to
participate. The current social norm is that people participate only if they have a good reason to do
so. The public goods argument implies that people should participate unless they have a good reason
not to. Such a shift would be of great aid to the progress of biomedical research, eventually making
our society significantly healthier and longer-lived.
Introduction
John has a chronic condition for which there is a partially effective standard treatment. His
physician tells him of a study testing a new therapy. Physicians are uncertain whether the new
therapy improves upon the standard treatment. Participation requires John be randomized to
either the standard or experimental treatment as well as receive extra blood draws and MRI
scans.
Should John enroll in the study? Does he have a duty to enroll? On the standard view, John’s
participation is above and beyond the call of duty. It would be good of him to participate, but
not wrong of him to refuse. On the obligation view, John has a moral duty to participate.
Assuming that the burdens and risks of participation are not excessive, it would be wrong to
refuse to participate.
We defend the obligation view. We do so not to make a philosophical point, but to stimulate
support for a major cultural shift in the way physicians, researchers, patients, and society at
large think about participation in research.
The Standard View
According to the standard view, participation in research is akin to giving blood or donating
to charity. 1–5 Participation that benefits society is supererogatory – while participants who
put themselves at risk or inconvenience deserve praise, people who refuse to participate in
research are not acting wrongly or unethically.
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Is There an Obligation to Participate in Research?
Although the standard view dominates current thinking, commentators have proposed two
arguments for the obligation view: beneficence and free riding.
Beneficence
According to the beneficence argument, if a person can prevent something bad or produce
some good then that person has a duty to perform that action.6–8 Any action that is beneficial
to society overall would be obligatory. Participation in many clinical trials is therefore
obligatory merely because it helps society at large.
It is certainly good to be beneficent, but the beneficence argument is excessively demanding
as a basis for an obligation to participate in research.9 It implies not only that people have an
obligation to participate in research, but also to perform numerous acts which we normally
consider supererogatory and to donate a large portion of their wealth for the sake of nobler
causes. Indeed, participation would be morally obligatory even if there were a significant risk
of harm so long as the expected societal benefit was sufficiently great. This argument is in our
view unreasonably demanding.
In addition, if we accept a weaker version of the beneficence argument in which people have
an obligation to perform a limited number of beneficent acts, the beneficence argument would
not explain why one has a special obligation to participate in biomedical research as contrasted
with other beneficent acts such as donating to charity.10
Free Riding
According to another argument, the failure to participate in research is a form of free-riding.
6, 11–14 Free-riding occurs when a person receives a benefit that others pay for and takes
advantage of the contributors by refusing to share the burden of obtaining it. An example is
the speed hump: Frederick’s neighborhood has a problem with speeders, and all the residents
agree that a speed hump would make everyone much safer. Their municipality will allow the
hump to be built only if the residents of the street pay for it themselves. The cost of Frederick
helping the neighborhood pay for the hump is worth the hump’s benefit to him, but he knows
his neighbors want the hump so much that they will pay for it even if he does not contribute.
Surely he should help pay.
The free-riding argument claims that people benefit from biomedical research. Usually they
actively seek out the benefits, consuming safer, more effective medical treatments. Sometimes
they benefit passively, as exemplified by herd immunity due to vaccination. By refusing to
participate in biomedical research but accepting these benefits, people are free-riding on the
people who participate.
Although this free-riding argument appears attractive, it fails for participation in research. The
burdens of participating in biomedical research that current participants assume are not
alleviated when people like John participate.4, 5 Implicit in the free-riding argument is the
claim that doing one’s fair share will relieve others of the burdens of participation. Although
this is true for the speed hump, it is not true with respect to biomedical research. John would
not be paying back any actual participants – he is benefitting someone who will in fact not
participate. Unlike the free-riding case, more participation helps society at large and future
generations, but does nothing to relieve the burdens on people who are actually participating
in research.
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Participating in Research Contributes To a Public Good
People have an obligation to participate in biomedical research because the knowledge
produced by the system of biomedical research is what economists call a “public good.”
A public good has two characteristics: First, one person’s use of that good does not diminish
another’s use of that good; and second, it is impractical to prevent people from using the good.
15–17 Conversely, a good is private if one person’s use does diminish another’s use or if it is
feasible to provide it to some people but withhold it from others. Typical examples of public
goods are national security, a fireworks display, street cleaning, and clean air.18 One citizen’s
benefit from a fireworks display or national security does not diminish another’s benefit and
a person cannot be prevented from benefitting from a fireworks display or national security
even if he or she does not contribute to its provision. Who provides the good is irrelevant to
whether it is public or private. A private company might provide a public good like fireworks,
while a government could provide unemployment benefits, which is a private good because it
can be given to unemployed individuals but not to others.
There is a crucial difficulty in generating public goods. Normally, there is no incentive for any
individual to contribute to a public good even if the benefit of that public good to the individual
is greater than the cost of contribution.16 No individual can be denied the benefit of a public
good no matter how much or how little he has contributed himself. For that reason, public
goods tend to be under-supplied.19 To overcome this problem, society sometimes compels
people to contribute: For instance, society mandates that cars come equipped with catalytic
converters in order to provide the public good of clean air. In other cases, society gives people
positive incentives to contribute, such as subsidizing administration of the flu vaccine to
provide the public good of herd immunity. In still other cases, people contribute because they
believe they have an obligation to do so. Many people vote not because they think that their
vote will make a difference to an election’s particular outcome but because they believe they
have an obligation to support the public good of electoral democracy.20, 21
Biomedical research is devoted to generating a public good -- generalizeable biomedical
knowledge.22 Assuming that the knowledge is made public, one person’s use of that knowledge
does not deprive others of using it. Moreover, the benefit of that knowledge cannot be withheld
from the public. The benefits of medical research to the public over the past century have been
both significant and public, from the eradication of smallpox and near-eradication of polio to
the development of penicillin, modern surgical techniques, and other life-saving discoveries.
In addition to developing new interventions, biomedical research produces very important
public knowledge of conditions and already-available treatments, as exemplified by research
demonstrating that a lumpectomy is often just as effective as mastectomy in the treatment of
breast cancer.23, 24
Clinical investigators, research institutions, and funding agencies were indispensible to these
advances – but so too were the millions of people who agreed to be participants in the research
which proved the effectiveness of the interventions that worked and, no less importantly, the
ineffectiveness of those that did not.
Because the enterprise of biomedical research produces the important benefit of medical
knowledge that is an advantage to us all, we all have an obligation to support that system of
knowledge generation by participating in biomedical research. If it turned out that biomedical
research with human subjects was not that important after all – that society would not be much
worse off if all research on humans were to cease – then there would be no obligation to
participate. But barring convincing evidence that such research is in fact unimportant, there is
a duty to participate in research.
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Free riding vs. public goods
Although the classic free riding argument and the public goods argument both appeal to a duty
to do one’s fair share, there are crucial differences between them. First the public goods
argument aids the cause, instead of merely splitting the bill. For example, suppose the catalytic
converter on Daniel’s car has deteriorated. Daniel has benefitted greatly from the reduction in
pollution produced by catalytic converters. Should he replace his converter? The free riding
argument is inapplicable here because replacing the converter would not ease the burden of
pollution control on others. But according to the public goods argument, he should do his part
in contributing to the public good of pollution control.
Second, a free-rider obligation requires relief for people currently contributing. By
comparison, discharging a public goods obligation makes society better off in the future. This
is why the public goods argument applies in John’s case while the classic free-rider argument
does not. John’s participation helps supply present and future generations with important
medical knowledge while not necessarily reducing the burden on those participants who made
the knowledge available to him.
Nature of the obligation
The obligation to participate in research is not absolute. Rather, people have what philosophers
call a prima facie obligation to participate.25 In other words, there may be circumstances or
reasons that override or mitigate the force of the duty. For example, a parent may permissibly
break a promise to meet a friend in order to care for his sick child. Similarly, if participating
in a trial requires John to violate a sincere religious belief about bodily integrity or is excessively
burdensome, then John’s obligation to participate in research has been overridden and he is
not morally required to participate.
It is difficult to specify the strength of the obligation to participate in research with any
precision. Is it more important to spend a few hours with one’s family or participate in research?
Does the obligation hold if you live quite far from the research center? As with most theories
of obligation, there is no mathematical algorithm. Tensions between obligations are an
inevitable feature of our moral lives.26, 27 This does not undermine or negate the obligation,
but only highlights the complexity of ethical decisions. Nonetheless, the obligation has force.
The obligation means that we start from the assumption that John ought to participate in the
study. If he were to refuse, John should have a good reason for doing so.
How much is John required to do? John has an obligation to do his “fair share” of participation.
9 He is not required to enter every trial for which he eligible. By analogy, how often must an
academic agree to review manuscripts for journals? Given that scholars benefit from the peer
review system, they have a prima facie obligation to do their fair share of reviewing when
asked. Yet they need not accept every request. Although there is no formula to determine how
often one must accept such requests, or what factors can legitimately override the obligation,
such moral uncertainty does not undermine the claim that academics have such an obligation.
Similar uncertainty should not undermine the claim that everyone has a duty to participate in
biomedical research.
Implications of the Obligation to Participate in Research
Enforcement
To say that John has a moral obligation to participate in a clinical trial does not mean that John
should be legally compelled to do so. It is perfectly coherent to argue that there is a duty to
vote but that people should not be compelled to do so, and no nation enforces an obligation to
keep promises to friends even though most people think that one has an obligation to do so.
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Legal coercion may be a legitimate tool in certain circumstances, such as paying taxes for
defense or making cars with catalytic converters, but it is not so for biomedical research. There
are sound moral reasons for thinking that a person should be able to decide what happens to
his body even if he decides not to do what he is morally obligated to do, the kind of right to
privacy inferred from the U.S. constitution28, 29 and explicit in the European Convention on
Human Rights.30 A person’s right over his body can justly be overridden in some
circumstances, such as when society compels people to take a vaccine. But the need for
biomedical research today does not qualify as such an extraordinary circumstance. We should
also be wary of broader societal implications of compulsory participation.
An obligation to participate in biomedical research would also not alter the requirements of
informed consent. If Robert has loaned tools to Samantha on many occasions, we might say
that Samantha has an obligation of reciprocity to loan her tools to Robert when asked.
Nonetheless, it would still be wrong for Robert to take Samantha’s tools without Samantha’s
consent. Similarly, although one may have an obligation to participate in research, we can and
should still insist that the participant give informed consent to do so.
The obligation to participate in research does not undermine the right to withdraw from
participation in a trial.31 To say that subjects have a right to withdraw is not to say that they
have no prima facie obligation to remain in a study. It is to say that they should not be penalized
for withdrawing even if withdrawal is wrong. And we are not proposing that subjects ever be
penalized for withdrawal.
Personal obligation
Individuals ought to participate in clinical trials when presented with the option. Well-
functioning IRBs ensure that the risks are not going to be excessive relative to the benefits of
research. When the risks are significant, the obligation may be weaker.
The obligation to participate applies to both healthy volunteers and patients. Both are needed
to advance biomedical knowledge. For patients, there is an obligation to agree to participate
in a study involving their condition when appropriate. Healthy individuals should participate
in a fair share of the research for which they are eligible and needed.
Cultural change
Just as many claim that citizens have an obligation to vote even though they are not legally
required to do so, society should come to recognize that everyone has an obligation to
participate in research when it is not excessively burdensome to do so. The current default
position is “you don’t have to participate in research if you don’t want to.” Instead, the default
should be: “you should participate unless you have good reasons not to.” We advocate a cultural
and moral change, not a legal one.
One strategy to affirm and reinforce the belief that people have an obligation to participate in
research would be a publicity campaign analogous to get-out-the-vote efforts which have
helped convince 90% of Americans that there is a duty to vote.21 The language of current
advertisements could change from calling participants “everyday heroes” – implying
participating is supererogatory – to using language similar to recycling ads: “do your part,” or
“it’s your turn to participate.”
Another strategy operates at the individual level. Researchers could use moral encouragement
when attempting to recruit participants instead of emphasizing benefits to the individual as
reasons to join studies.32, 33 Additionally, physicians should be more willing to actively recruit
patients onto important clinical trials.34 Such encouragement would have to be given carefully;
there is a risk that the participants would fear abandonment by their physician if they refused
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to participate. In the very least, researchers can legitimately inform patients about how
important biomedical research has been and will be to everyone’s well being.
Paying Others to Participate in one’s Stead
In theory, the obligation to participate could be fulfilled by paying someone else to participate.
Most U.K. and U.S. citizens discharge their obligation to defend their country by paying for
an all-volunteer army through taxes. In principle, we could pay research participants enough
so that no one would have to be asked to make any sacrifice by participation. But there are
practical and moral limitations to this strategy. It would be in inordinately expensive to increase
payment to research subjects enough to attract the millions of participants who are needed
above current levels. In addition, we must be concerned about undue inducements. Offering
someone enough to participate when that person would otherwise prefer not to might lead that
person to misunderstand the burdens and risks of participation. Additional concerns over
exploitation and data reliability emerge if participation is done abroad for the sake of speed
and budget savings.35 But if we are reluctant to pay people to participate abroad, we will have
to put in more effort ourselves and be willing to participate ourselves. Given these limitations,
the obligation to participate is often best discharged by personal participation.
Objections Considered
The public goods argument is admittedly a minority position, and advocates of the standard
view are likely to raise several objections which we will briefly address.
Alternate contribution
Certain individuals can discharge their obligation to participate by contributing financially to
other public goods, or societal goods in general. Instead of participating in research, a person
could donate to Oxfam or the Special Olympics.10
It is practically infeasible to attempt a moral “accounting,” where someone weighs the good
deeds he or she has recently done to see if they are sufficient. And even if such were possible,
it is problematic to have contributions in one sphere of action offset duties to contribute to
other spheres. For example, a person’s duty to recycle does not go away even if he has donated
vast sums of money to charity. Similarly, participation in biomedical research is a separate
sphere of activity from charitable contributions. Aiding in the sphere of charitable donations,
then, would not be a way to offset one’s obligation to assist the sphere of biomedical research
through participation.
Current contribution
The obligation to support biomedical research is fulfilled by paying taxes that support research
at the NIH or MRC, paying drug prices and buying health insurance.36, 37
Biomedical research needs participants as well as financial support.38 There are too few
participants and adding more funding will probably not solve that problem. A shortfall of
participants in biomedical research slows the completion of clinical trials more than lack of
funding.39, 40 By one estimate, if the proportion cancer patients that agree to participate in
clinical trials were to increase from its current five percent to 10 percent, the usual study
completion rate would decrease from around four years to one year.41 Another estimate
suggests that at least 16 million more people are needed to participate in research trials each
year.42
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The obligation to support research is preserved even if one has paid for insurance, purchased
drugs, etc. Our situation is in some ways analogous to a wartime call to arms – not just money
but soldiers to actually fight are needed.
Equity
Wealthy people receive more benefits from biomedical research than poorer people; they are
more able to afford new, expensive drugs and interventions. A poorer person does not have an
obligation to support an institution that primarily benefits the wealthy.43, 44
The public goods argument maintains that an individual has an obligation to participate in
research only if the burden of participation is less than that overall benefit of biomedical
research to the individual. It is an open empirical question whether or not wealthy people
ultimately get more benefit out of biomedical research than poorer people, but it is likely that
the benefit from research to the poor exceeds the burden of participation for the poor as well.
There is some evidence that while poor populations lag behind in health improvements
compared to the wealthy, the poor populations often manage to catch up as interventions
become cheap and widely available.45 This is partially because medical knowledge is a public
good; wealthy people’s access to medical knowledge does not preclude poorer people from
having access to it. Even if delayed, poorer people still receive benefits from interventions
originally targeted at the wealthy. Access to a tuberculosis vaccine or AZT, for example, may
be delayed for the less affluent, but they eventually get access and ultimately a greater
improvement in their lives from the research since less affluent people are more threatened by
diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.
Excessive burden on the sick
Because much research can be conducted only with those with a particular disease or condition
the obligation to participate in biomedical research falls disproportionately on sick individuals
who already suffered enough. An obligation for the sick to participate in trials is unreasonably
demanding.5
While it is unfortunate that the sick bear a disproportionate burden of participation in research,
it is not unfair. It is an unavoidable fact of life that some obligations fall on some people and
not others. It is not unfair that a witness to a crime has an obligation to report it and testify in
court, whereas people who happen not to be witnesses have no such obligation. People
sometimes acquire obligations simply because of the circumstances in which they find
themselves by accident.
Patent protection
Three-quarters of all biomedical research is actually sponsored by pharmaceutical companies.
41 While there may be an obligation to participate in publically-funded research, patented
biomedical knowledge is not a public good. Hence, participation in industry-sponsored
research which may produce patented knowledge is not an obligation.
Patents expire. Statins like Lipitor, for example, will soon be widely available at generic prices.
Moreover, a patent protects the production of a drug or device, but the knowledge of its effects
is the public good. That knowledge is a core value of biomedical research, and it is the result
of public and private research alike. Indeed, a private company can provide a public good.
What matters is that the good is available to everyone, not that a public institution provide it.
Consequently, we can have obligations to help private companies produce public goods. By
analogy, someone might support the public good of national defense by working in a privately
company producing bullet-proof vests instead of in a more lucrative profession. In the case of
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biomedical research, private companies even have an incentive to spread the knowledge of a
drug or device effectiveness to physicians since that is an effective way to get physicians to
recommend those interventions. Whether a study is publically or privately financed has little
bearing in itself on the obligation to participate in that study.
Unsuccessful research
Much research benefits no one. Only a small percent of drugs tested will ever make it to market.
Negative results are often not even published. Given the small chance any particular research
study has to generate an effective intervention, the obligation would seem to be very weak.41
A negative result that is unpublished and unreleased is not a public good. That is a good reason
to encourage the dissemination of the results of all studies. However, negative results which
are disseminated to the medical community are indeed a public good. Knowing what does not
work can be useful in itself and can contribute to other studies.
Even if many studies would not in hindsight be worth the effort, it only matters that the benefits
of the research are expected to be worthwhile before the research is completed. Given that the
research enterprise overall produces valuable public goods, and IRBs have determined that any
particular research study has overall positive expected social value, the obligation remains in
force. As Henry Beecher famously said, “An experiment is ethical or not at its inception; it
does not become ethical post hoc.”46 The same can be said of obligations – we should evaluate
the importance of our contributions from an ex ante perspective.
Conclusion
There is a prima facie obligation to participate in biomedical research. This obligation arises
because biomedical research produces the public good of biomedical knowledge - a good which
everyone has access to and which retains its value no matter how many people have access to
it. The results of research do not just help the rich or powerful – all of us take advantage of this
public good when we receive vaccines, take drugs, use medical devices, and the like. Many of
us owe our entire lives to the biomedical knowledge which could only be produced with the
contribution of many willing participants. The obligation to participate in biomedical research,
then, makes reasonable demands on all of us. Participating in research is much less burdensome
than contributing to many other public goods; joining the army is certainly more risky and
time-consuming than any clinical trial which has been approved by a well functioning IRB.
Indeed, paying taxes may be much more burdensome than participating in many research trials.
This is not to suggest that people have an obligation to become full-time guinea pigs. Instead,
there needs to be a cultural shift in the moral framework that we bring to participation in
research. The standard view of research participation must be changed from one in which
participation is supererogatory to one in which people need to give a good reason not to
participate. The shift is from participation in biomedical research being, like charity, above the
call of duty, to such participation being a moral obligation for everyone to do his part.
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